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KEEPING THE CITIZENS Our: How VIRGINIA HAS MANIPULATED
THE MANDATE OF THE CLEAN WATER AcT
DEMIAN SCHANE*
"The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity
of the State."--James Madison'
Traditionally, law enforcement authority has vested with the states.
Before 1972, there were federal and state efforts to manage water pollution,
but the states were in charge of establishing water quality standards and
enforcing them.2 The failure of this polluter-friendly system was illustrated
when the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio burst into flames.3 When
Congress enacted the 1972 Amendments to the Clean Water Act4 ("CWA"
or "Act"), it sought to revitalize the health of our waters and to promulgate
enforcement mechanisms to protect them for the future.5
The CWA envisions a collaborative effort among states, citizens, and
the federal government. A current view of the Act's structure is that the
federal and state governments play the leading role in enforcement, while
citizens fill in the gaps.6 This triumvirate, however, has not provided the
remedy for poor water quality that the CWA originally intended. A major
problem has been enforcement of the Act's standards.'
In Virginia, the courts and legislature have weakened considerably the
Mr. Schane received his B.A. in History from Dartmouth College in 1993, and expects
to receive his J.D. from the College of William and Mary School of Law in May of 1997.
'THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 137 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairchild ed. 1981) (emphasis
added).
2 See ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 6-7 (1993).
3 See id. at 5.
4 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994)).
' Congress stated that its goal was "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters." CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
6 See North & South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 555 (1st
Cir. 1991) (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60
(1987)).
7See generally ADLER ET AL., supra note 2 (citing enforcement problems under the CWA).
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citizen's role in enforcing the CWA. Termed citizen attorneys general,
interested persons normally can enforce the provisions of the CWA by filing
suits in court when a permit is violated or when a permit does not meet the
requirements of the CWA, but the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
issued it anyway. Virginia courts have curtailed this role by denying standing
to those citizens who challenge the legality of state-issued pollution permits.8
Responding to petitions from several environmental groups, the EPA
proposed to amend the requirements a state must satisfy in order to receive
federal authorization for implementing a permit program under section 402
of the CWA.9 If EPA promulgates the proposal, the CWA would "require
that state law must provide any interested person an opportunity to challenge
the approval or denial of 402 permits issued by the State in State court."'"
This change targets Virginia and would reverse Virginia's current practice."
As a result, Virginia's Attorney General ("Attorney General") and
Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") 2 submitted comments
opposing EPA's proposal.
This Note examines the need for and the legality of this proposed rule.
It accomplishes this end -through a study of the CWA, Virginia's
implementation of section 402's permit program, and related legal issues.
Specifically, Part I briefly explores the structure of the permitting scheme
under the CWA. Part II discusses the standing doctrine and how the Virginia
courts and legislature have frustrated the CWA's mandate that public
participation in enforcing the CWA be encouraged. 3 Part III focuses on the
basis for EPA's proposed rule and illustrates Virginia's challenge to it.
Lastly, Part IV examines a permit issued by DEQ and concludes that EPA's
proposed rule is needed in order to effectuate the intent behind the CWA.
8 See discussion infra Part H.A.
'See Amendment to Requirements for Authorized State Permit Programs Under Section
402 of the Clean Water Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,588 (1995) [hereinafter Amendment] (codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 123.30) (proposed Mar. 17, 1995).
10 Id. (emphasis added).
"Other states also would be affected. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 166 n. 148.
12 The DEQ is Virginia's equivalent of the federal EPA. Before the DEQ was created,
Virginia's environmental regulations were managed by the State Water Control Board
("SWCB"). DEQ replaced this agency in 1994.
"3 See CWA § 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1994).
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I. THE PERMIT PROCESS UNDER THE CWA
The Clean Water Act deems "the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful"14 except under certain circumstances such as
pursuant to a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permit." The Act defines the "discharge of any pollutant"1 6 as "any addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."17 Any
"person"'" who discharges or wants to discharge a pollutant from a point
source into the waters of the United States must apply for a permit.' 9
A. Obtaining a Permit
In order to obtain a permit, an applicant must provide EPA with
information regarding the planned facility and its proposed discharges.2" The
applicant also must obtain certification from the state in which the discharge
originates.21 The state's certification ensures that the discharge complies with
all applicable state water quality standards.22
"CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
The permit establishes "specific, end-of-the-pipe effluent limitations on the discharger
that reflect the more stringent of either national technology-based minimum effluent
standards or local water quality standards." David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental
Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement
Authority Is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV.
1552, 1569 (1995).
16 Under the Act, a "'pollutant' means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue,
sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials,
radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and
industrial, municipal, and agricultural wasted discharged into water." CWA § 502(6), 33
U.S.C. § 1362(6).
17 CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). "The term 'point source' means any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding
operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged."
CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
"'Me Act defines "person" to include "an individual, corporation, partnership, association,
State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."
CWA § 502(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5).
19 See THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 60 (Parthenia B. Evans ed. 1994).
20 See 40 C.F.R. § 124.3 (1995).
2, See CWA § 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
22 See 40 C.F.R. § 124.55.
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If these requirements are met, EPA prepares a draft permit and
explanatory fact sheet. 23 EPA then provides the public with notice, thereby
initiating a thirty-day public comment period.24 During this comment period,
persons who believe the proposed permit is improper must raise all
reasonably ascertainable issues and arguments in support of their position. 25
Furthermore, during this period any interested person can request a public
hearing.26 Once the comment period and hearing (if requested) end, EPA
considers the administrative record compiled during the comment period and
determines whether the permit should be issued.27
After EPA makes its final decision on the permit, any interested party
may request an evidentiary hearing 28 to challenge EPA's resolution of any
issue raised during the comment period.29 If EPA denies a request for an
evidentiary hearing, then after thirty days, the decision constitutes final
agency action unless an appeal is made to the Environmental Appeals Board
("Board").30 If the Board denies this appeal (or hears it but affirms the
decision), then the decision is final.3" Under section 509(b)(1) of the CWA,
"any interested person" may obtain review of the EPA's final permit
decision.32
B. State Implementation of the NPDES Permit Program
Section 402 of the CWA governs the permitting process. Under
subsection (a), EPA has the authority, after a public hearing, to issue a permit
for the discharge of any pollutant. A state, however, may assume this permit-
issuing authority unless EPA determines the state does not meet certain
23 See id. §§ 124.6, .8, .56.
24 See id. § 124.10(a)(1)(ii), (b)(1).
25See id. § 124.13.
26See id. § 124.11.
"See id. §§ 124.15, .18, .19.
28 Evidentiary hearings typically are more formal than a public hearing in that they are
more adjudicatory in nature and therefore, normally involve a formal record. See Hamilton,
Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability. The Need for Procedural
Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1276 (1972).
29 See 40 C.F.R. § 124.74(a).
30 See id. §§ 124.60(c)(5), .91.
3' See id. § 124.91(0(1). See generally Adams v. Environmental Protection Agency, 38
F.3d 43, 47-48 (1st Cir. 1994) (discussing final agency action).
32 See CWA § 509(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1994).
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conditions. 3
At a minimum, the state must demonstrate it has the capability to
issue permits, to modify or terminate them,34 to ensure that the public and any
affected state receive notice for each permit application, to provide an
opportunity for public comment and a hearing on permit decisions,35 to abate
permit violations, and to provide appropriate civil and criminal penalties as
enforcement mechanisms.36 If a state meets these requirements, EPA must
approve its program.37
EPA can still revoke its approval should the state fail to maintain
section 402's requirements of the permit program. The CWA provides:
Whenever the Administrator determines after public hearing
that a State is not administering a program approved under
this section in accordance with requirements of this section,
he shall so notify the State and, if appropriate corrective
action is not taken within a reasonable time, not to exceed
ninety days, the Administrator shall withdraw approval of
such program.38
EPA must first notify the state of its intention to withdraw the program and
supply it with the reasons for its decision.39 In addition to the power of
revocation, the CWA enables EPA to oversee a state's permit program.
Where a state has assumed the permit issuing power, the CWA
requires the state to submit a copy of every permit application to EPA.40 At
this point, EPA can object to the permit and, provided EPA follows the notice
3 See CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
"' The modification or termination could occur when a permit holder violates the set
conditions or makes misrepresentations in obtaining the permit or when changes in any
condition occur that require either a reduction or end to the permitted discharge. See CWA
§ 402(b)(1)(C)(i)-(iii), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(C)(i)-(iii).
" See CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
36 See THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 75-76.
17 See CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
" CWA § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3).
39 See id.
4
1 See id. § 1342(d)(1).
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and statement of reasons guidelines, the state cannot issue the permit. 41 In
practice, however, EPA does not review all permit actions; instead, EPA and
the state draw up a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") which identifies
those categories of permits EPA will review.42 After the permit is approved,
citizen attorneys general can challenge its legality. This attack is only
possible where citizens have standing.
Section 505 of the CWA provides citizens with a right to judicial
review in certain circumstances and under certain conditions. It states:
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own
behalf-(1) against any person (including (i) the United
States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or
agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to
the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an
order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to
such a standard or limitation, or (2) against the Administrator
where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator. 3
Thus, where EPA runs the NPDES program, interested citizens can file
claims against polluters who violate their permits and against EPA when it
issues a permit in violation of the standards established under the CWA." In
Virginia, however,, courts no longer grant standing to citizen attorneys
general who seek to challenge the DEQ for issuing a permit that does not
"' See id. § 1342(d)(2). EPA must submit in writing the reasons for the objection and the
actions that must be taken to eliminate the objection, including the effluent limitations and
conditions that the permit would include if issued by the EPA. See id.
42 See THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 76. EPA may not waive
review of "discharges into the territorial sea; discharges which may affect the waters of a
state other than the one in which the discharge originates; discharges proposed to be
regulated by general permits .... ." Id.
43 CWA § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
"See CWA § 509(b)(1)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (Stating that any interested person
may seek review of EPA's issuance or denial of a NPDES permit); see also Adams v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 38 F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[O]nce an EPA permit
decision has become final, any interested person may obtain judicial review of the decision
by petitioning for review in the Circuit Court of Appeals.") (emphasis added).
462 [Vol. 21:457
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comport with the standards of the CWA.
II. CHALLENGING STATE ISSUED PERMITS IN VIRGINIA
A. Standing
Although the CWA broadens the "categories of injury that may be
alleged in support of standing," a plaintiff still must satisfy the constitutional
requirements for standing to exist.45 The Supreme Court has recognized three
minimal conditions that must be proven. 6 First, the plaintiff must have
suffered an "injury in fact;" second, there must be a causal relationship such
that the injury is traceable to the defendant's conduct; and third, the injury
will likely be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.47 In environmental
actions, plaintiffs have met these minimal requirements where they suffered
injury to their aesthetic or recreational interests so long as the interest was
more than a general environmental protectionist one.48 Because these are
only the minimum requirements, Congress or state legislatures are free to
enact statutes that create more stringent standing prerequisites.
Virginia assumed authority to issue NPDES permits (known as
VPDES permits), but in doing so, Virginia's legislature also created stricter
standing requirements than the CWA when it passed the State Water Control
Law ("SWCL"). This decision contradicts Congress' stated policy that
"[p]ublic participation in the development, revision, and enforcement of any
regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan, or program established by the
Administrator or any State under this chapter shall be provided for,
encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator and the States. 49
45 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (quoting Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-41 n.16 (1972)).46 These requirements are derived from Article III of the Constitution which "limits the
jurisdiction of federal courts to 'Cases' and 'Controversies' . . . ." Id. at 559.
41 See id. at 560-61.
48 See THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 219.
41 CWA § 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e). Furthermore, in enacting the CWA, the Senate
stated, "A high degree of informed public participation in the control process is essential to
the accomplishment of the objectives we seek-a restored and protected natural
environment." A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, S. REP. No. 92-414, at 11 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3668, 3679 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
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B. Virginia's Standing
In Virginia, citizens are prevented from using the judicial system to
ensure that permits are lawful. This obstacle is the result of Virginia's state
courts' resolution of a conflict between Virginia's Administrative Process
Act ("VAPA") and its State Water Control Law. VAPA indicates that
[a]ny person affected by and claiming the unlawfulness of any
regulation, or party aggrieved by and claiming unlawfulness
of a case decision, . .. shall have a right to the direct review
thereof by an appropriate and timely court action against the
agency as such or its officers or agents in the manner
provided by the rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.50
Virginia's Water Control Law provides "[a]ny owner aggrieved by a final
decision of the [State Water Control] Board5 . . . is entitled to judicial review
thereof in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Process
Act."52 Reconciling the difference between "person affected" and "owner
aggrieved," Virginia courts have held the state legislature incorporated the
restrictive latter to supersede the former for actions based on section 62.1-
44.29 of the SWCL.
53
Virginia Beach Beautification Commission v. Board of Zoning
Appeals,54 Environmental Defense Fund v. Virginia State Water Control
Board,55 and Town of Fries v. State Water Control Board5 6 demonstrate this
interpretation. In Virginia Beach Beautification Commission, the Supreme
Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court's decision that the Virginia
Beautification Commission ("Commission") lacked standing.57  The
SO Virginia Administrative Process Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:16 (Michie 1995)
(emphasis added).
S" The State Water Control Board ("SWCB") has been incorporated into the Department
of Environmental Quality ("DEQ"). See supra note 12.
52 State Water Control Law, VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29 (Michie 1995) (emphasis
added).
"' See supra text accompanying note 28 to contrast the liberal standing provided where the
EPA issues the permit.
54 344 S.E.2d 899 (Va. 1986).
55 404 S.E.2d 728 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
56 409 S.E.2d 634 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
57 See 344 S.E.2d at 903.
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Commission was a 400-member corporation whose goal was "to help make
and keep Virginia Beach one of the most beautiful cities in the state.""8
When the Board of Zoning Appeals ("Board") approved a plan to permit
construction of an advertising sign on a highway, the Commission sued in
an attempt to reverse the Board's decision.59
The Commission filed its suit pursuant to a Virginia statute which
provides that any person "aggrieved" by any decision of the Board of Zoning
Appeals can seek judicial review.60 The thrust of the court's decision was
that for a person to be "aggrieved," she must have some direct interest in the
subject matter of the claim.6 The court further elaborated that a direct
interest means the person must have 'an immediate, pecuniary and
substantial interest in the litigation, and not a remote or indirect interest."' 62
Thus, according to the court, "[t]he word 'aggrieved' in a statute
contemplates a substantial grievance and means a denial of some personal or
property right, legal or equitable, or imposition of a burden or obligation
upon the petitioner different from that suffered by the public generally."63
Because the Commission owned no property within or in close proximity to
the advertising sign, it did not qualify as an "aggrieved" party.'
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Virginia State Water Control
Board, SWCB had granted a poultry processing plant's request to modify its
discharge permit such that it could discharge differing amounts of effluent in
correlation with changes in the river flow rates.65 Under the modified permit,
the plant could discharge higher amounts during the rainy season when the
river flow was high and lower amounts during the dry season when the river
flow was low.66 The Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") contested the
58 Id. at 902.
'9 See id. at 900.
60 See id. at 902.
61 See id.
62Id. (quoting from Nicholas v. Lawrence, 171 S.E. 673, 674 (Va. 1933)).
63 Id. at 902-03.
6 See id. at 903.
65 See 404 S.E.2d 728, 729 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
66 See id.
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validity of the permit.67 The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's holding that EDF lacked standing.
The court held that when a law contains a specific standing
requirement, that requirement "is controlling over the standardized court
review" in the Virginia Administrative Process Act.68 Therefore, in order for
EDF to have standing, it had to demonstrate that it was an "owner aggrieved"
as incorporated in the State Water Control Law and not merely a party
"affected." 69 The court focused on who was an owner, and it agreed with the
lower court that an owner is "'any entity subject to the State Water Control
Board's power and jurisdiction; i.e., any entity which owns or operates an
actual or potential discharge source .or a permit issued by the Board.'
70
Finally, in Town of Fries v. State Water Control Board, the Virginia
Court of Appeals demonstrated how the narrow meaning of "owner
aggrieved" restricts judicial review of state issued permits. The Town of
Fries, the Fries Civic League, Natural Sands and Products, Inc., and fifteen
riparian landowners sought judicial review of a VPDES permit granted by
SWCB to the City of Galax. 71 The permit authorized the City of Galax "to
build an enlarged sewage treatment plant that would discharge directly into
the New River, upstream of the Town of Fries. 72 Citing Virginia Beach
Beautification Commission and Environmental Defense Fund, the court held
that none of the plaintiffs was an "owner aggrieved," and that therefore they
67See id. at 730. In addition, the processing plant had requested the permit modification
pursuant to an SWCB internal memorandum permitting all regional directors to employ
flow-tiered standards in VPDES permits. See id. at 729. EDF challenged the validity of
using this memorandum as a rule or regulation because it was not promulgated in accordance
with the rulemaking procedures outlined in the Virginia Administrative Process Act. See
id. at 730. The court never addressed this issue because it found EDF lacked standing. See
id. at 732.
68 Id.
69 Although the trial court had ruled EDF was neither a "party" nor "affected," the court
of appeals held that only the restrictive "owner aggrieved" standard should be applied. See
id. at 730-32.
70 Id. at 732 (quoting from the trial court). The court frurther noted this interpretation
coincided with the Legislature's 1990 amendment to the SWCL which further limited the
definition of owner to one "'that owns, operates, charters, rents, or otherwise exercises
control over or is responsible for any actual or potential discharge of sewage, industrial
wastes, or other wastes to state waters . . . .' Id. (quoting from State Water Control Law,
VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.3(5) (Michie 1995)).
7' See 409 S.E.2d 634, 635 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
7 Id. at 635-36.
[Vol. 21:457466
KEEPING THE CITIZENS OUT
failed to prove standing.73
The Town of Fries represented citizens who intended to use the New
River for drinking water, the fifteen individuals "simply own[ed] land
adjoining the New River, and, although Natural Sands and Products, Inc.,
held a VPDES permit, its only interest was due to the possible degradation
of New River. 74 Although this interest may not have been sufficient to
constitute an "owner aggrieved" and, thus, to satisfy Virginia's standing
requirement, the Town of Fries would have standing in federal court to
challenge EPA for issuing the same permit. Under section 509(b) of the
CWA, "any interested person" may challenge EPA for issuing a permit that
allegedly violates the Act.75 The Supreme Court of the United States has
noted that "[t]he review provisions of § 509 are open to '[a]ny person,' and
thus provide an additional procedure to 'private attorneys general' seeking to
enforce the Act .... *"76 To remedy the inconsistency between Virginia's
permit program and those that the federal government runs, EPA proposed
to augment the requirements a state must meet to assume control of the
NPDES permit program.
III. THE PROPOSAL
The EPA cites sections 101(e), 304(i), 402(b) and (c), and 501(a) of
the CWA for its authority to promulgate the rule.77 Section 501(a) authorizes
EPA to "prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out [its]
functions under this chapter. '78 According to Congress, one of EPA's
functions is to foster public participation in enforcing the CWA.
Section 101(e) states, "[P]ublic participation in the development,
revision, and enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation,
plan, or program established by the Administrator or any State under this
" See id. at 637.
74 Id.
75 See CWA § 509(b)(1)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (1994).
76 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14
n.23 (1981) (referring to S. REP. No. 92-414, at 85 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3668, 3746). See generally D. Brennen Keene, Comment, The Inconsistency of Virginia's
Execution of the NPDES Permit Program. The Foreclosure of Citizen Attorneys General
From State and Federal Courts, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 715, 738-42 (1995).
7 See Amendment, supra note 9, at 14,589.
71 CWA § 501(a), 33 U.S.C § 1361(a).
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chapter shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator
and the States."79 This section clearly demonstrates one congressional goal
in implementing the CWA. Furthermore, the legislative history of this
section supports EPA's argument that Congress intended to promote public
participation in the enforcement process. The Senate report claimed, "[a]
high degree of informed public participation in the control process is essential
to the accomplishment of the objectives we seek-a restored and protected
natural environment."8° Thus, as a general statement of policy, section 101 (e)
supports EPA's proposed rule. The other sections EPA cites provide the
specific powers upon which EPA relies for instituting the additional
requirement that a state provide access to its courts to any interested person
when contesting the approval or denial of a NPDES permit. Virginia's
challenge to EPA's authority for implementing this proposal is unpersuasive.
In his comments to EPA, Virginia's Attorney General made four
arguments contesting the legality of requiring states to provide judicial
review to citizens who wish to challenge the approval or denial of state issued
NPDES permits.8" First, he argued Congress did not grant EPA authority to
impose such a requirement. 82 He stated that EPA's reliance on sections
402(b) and 304(i) for its authority to promulgate the proposed rule was
misplaced.83 The Attorney General's arguments, however, are unconvincing.
They focus on each section in isolation and construe EPA's authority under
the CWA too narrowly.
According to Virginia's Attorney General, "[t]he plain reading of
§ 402(b) does not lend itself to an interpretation that Congress intended EPA
to interfere with the judicial review and citizen standing provisions of state
law."84 Furthermore, because Virginia meets all of the requirements of
section 402(b) and because the section states the Administrator "shall
approve" a state program if those elements are met, EPA is without authority
" CWA § 101(e), § 1251(e) (emphasis added).
80 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 49, at 12, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3679.
8" See Letter from James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General for the Commonwealth of
Virginia, to Carol Browner, Adminstrator of the Enviornmental Protection Agency (June 9,
1995) (commenting on the Amendment to Requirements for Authorized State Permit
Programs Under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act) (copy on file with William & Mary
Environmental Law & Policy Review) [hereinafter Letter from the Attorney General].
82 See id. at 5.
83 See id. at 5-6.
4 d. at 5.
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to alter Virginia's permit program.85 Section 402(b), however, provides EPA
with sufficient discretion to find Virginia's program inadequate.
Under section 402(b), "[t]he Administrator shall approve each
submitted program unless he determines that adequate authority does not
exist... to abate violations of the permit or the permit program, including
civil and criminal penalties and other ways and means of enforcement. '8 6
Therefore, in order to ensure the states themselves do not violate the permit
program, EPA could require a state to provide citizen attorneys general with
access to its courts.
One challenge to this interpretation contends that this section does not
apply to a state that violates the permit program but only to a permit holder.
Supporting this contention, one could argue that because section 402(d)(2)
provides EPA with the right to object to a permit, Congress provided EPA
with sufficient oversight of the states. Furthermore, because Congress spoke
on the issue, an interpretation of section 402(b)(7) giving EPA authority to
require states to permit citizen attorneys general the right to object to a permit
would render section 402(b) superfluous. This challenge, however, would
probably fail because section 402(b)(7) is general enough to be viewed as an
additional precaution in the event EPA is incapable of reviewing every state-
issued permit. In fact, EPA's resources are so inadequate that it reaches
agreements with states stipulating it will review only certain types of
" See id.
86 CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994) (emphasis added). In its proposed rule,
EPA did not cite CWA § 402(b)(7) but relied on § 402(b)(3) which provides that the
Administrator will approve a state permit program if it "'insure[s] that the public, and any
other State the waters of which may be affected, receive[s] notice of each application for a
permit and [ ] provide[s] an opportunity for public hearing before a ruling on each such
application."' Amendment, supra note 9, at 14,589 (quoting CWA § 402(b)(3), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b)(3)). Virginia's Attorney General correctly challenges this purported basis for the
proposed rule. He argues EPA improperly treats public participation under section 402(b)(3)
as synonymous with judicial review. See Letter from the Attorney General, supra note 81,
at 8. Section 402(b)(3) provides EPA need not approve a state permit program unless the
state is able to "insure that the public ... receive[s] notice of each application for a permit
and to provide an opportunity for public hearing before a ruling on each such
application.. . ." CWA § 402(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3). The "public participation"
requirement does not demand a state to provide a trial. Under the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, an agency must hold a formal hearing when the statute requires a
determination "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)
(1994). The broad scope of section 402(b)(7) of the CWA, however, supplies EPA with the
proper authority. See infra text accompanying note 87.
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permits.87
The Virginia Attorney General's second argument focused on EPA's
alleged authority under section 304(i). This section authorizes EPA to:
promulgate guidelines establishing the minimum procedural
and other elements of any State program under section 1342
of this title, which shall include: (A) monitoring
requirements; (B) reporting requirements (including
procedures to make information available to the public); (C)
enforcement provisions; and (D) finding, personnel
qualifications, and manpower requirements (including a
requirement that no board or body which approves permit
applications or portions thereof shall include, as a member,
any person who receives, or has during the previous two years
received, a significant portion of his income directly or
indirectly from permit holders or applicants for a permit).88
The Attorney General's contention was that this section "appears to provide
EPA with even less authority than § 402(b) ... ."" The problem with this
argument is that it assumes the four listed types of requirements EPA must
create are the only types it can create. The statute, however, is not restrictive
becasue it states that the requirements "shall include." Therefore, this part of
the Attorney General's challenge to EPA's proposal also must fail.
The Attorney General's third contention was that Congress clearly
required judicial review of "[a]ction of the State regulatory authority pursuant
to an approved State program" in the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act ("SMCRA"); therefore, it knew how to impose such
specific requirements but chose not to do so in the CWA.9° Although this
argument is not without merit, it fails for two reasons.
First, the fact that two statutes do not use the same language but
permit the same regulations should not be dispositive. Unlike the Office of
Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement in the SMCRA, Congress may
have wanted to give EPA broader authority to decide which requirements to
" See supra text accompanying note 42.
88 CWA § 304(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(i) (emphasis added).
89 Letter from the Attorney General, supra note 81, at 5.
90 See id. at 6 (quoting SMCRA § 526(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(e) (1994)).
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impose on a state's permit program.91 Furthermore, this distinction is
supported by Congress' express desire that EPA, "in cooperation with the
States, shall develop and publish regulations specifying minimum guidelines
for public participation . *92 The SMCRA does not contain similar
language.
Second, provided EPA's interpretation of the CWA is reasonable, its
determination must govern:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.93
The permissibility of EPA's construction is demonstrated in the broad
language of sections 101, 304, 402, and 505 of the CWA.94
Finally, Virginia's Attorney General sought asylum in the Tenth
Amendment and claimed the proposed rule requires a state to waive its
9' Virginia's Attorney General tries to strengthen his argument by noting that the CWA's
amendments were passed contemporaneously with SMCRA (in 1977). See Letter from the
Attorney General, supra note 81, at 6. This point is not dispositive; furthermore, the relevant
provisions of the CWA were part of the original act passed in 1972.
92 CWA § 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e).
9 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (footnotes omitted).
4 See discussion supra Part III.
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sovereign immunity.95 He cited Gregory v. Ashcroft96 and claimed in order
to interfere with matters concerning a state's sovereign powers, Congress
must have made its intent "unmistakably clear" in the pertinent statute.97
Because the CWA allegedly is silent on State court review of State permitting
decisions, Congress' intent was not "unmistakably clear." '  Thus, the
Attorney General concluded that EPA's proposal would violate the Tenth
Amendment. There are two flaws in this claim: first, the Attorney General's
reliance on Gregory is misplaced, and second, he ignored prior case law more
on point.
The Attorney General used Gregory for the proposition that "where
Congress intends to interfere with the judgment of State authorities in a
matter which concerns the State's sovereign powers, that intent must be made
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. 99 Thus, because the CWA
is silent on judicial review in state courts of state permitting decisions, the
Attorney General argued EPA cannot interfere with Virginia's standing
provisions concerning the permit program. 'I He maintained that "before the
EPA [can] assume the authority to interfere with the judgments of State
authorities concerning the nature and extent of a waiver of sovereign
immunity, that authority must be clearly and unmistakably conferred by
Congress in the CWA." '  This argument assumes, however, that the
operation of the NPDES permit program is "a matter which concerns the
State's sovereign powers" and thus is subject to the the court's mandate in
Gregory.
The issue in Gregory involved a matter more relevant to a state's
sovereign powers. In Gregory, Missouri state judges challenged the Missouri
Constitution's mandatory requirement that all judges retire when they reach
the age of seventy.'02 In affirming its constitutionality, the Supreme Court
noted, "This provision goes beyond an area traditionally regulated by the
" See Letter from the Attorney General, supra note 81, at 7. Gilmore does not address
EPA's claim that sections 10 1(e) and 501(a) also support the proposal's validity.
96 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
" See Letter from the Attorney General, supra note 81, at 7.
9' See id.
99 Id.
100 See id.
101 Id.
102 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 455 (1991). The mandatory retirement did not
apply to municipal judges. See id.
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States; it is a decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity.
Through the structure of its government, and the character of those who
exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign. "103
Although the states originally regulated pollution, such power does not define
a state "as a sovereign." Moreover, where Congress promulgates federal
environmental regulation such that the states may play an active role in its
implementation, the Supreme Court has rejected Tenth Amendment
challenges.
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass 'n,"° the
Court denied a Tenth Amendment challenge to the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act. The Court explained:
[T]he States are not compelled to enforce the steep-slope
standards, to expend any state funds, or to participate in the
federal regulatory program in any manner whatsoever. If a
State does not wish to submit a proposed permanent program
that complies with the Act and implementing regulations, the
full regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal
Government. Thus, there can be no suggestion that the Act
commandeers the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a regulatory
program.... The most that can be said is that the Surface
Mining Act establishes a program of cooperative federalism
that allows the States, within limits established by federal
minimum standards, to enact and administer their own
regulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular
needs. 105
Like the SMCRA, the CWA does not require states to participate; it is
optional. Furthermore, as Congress could have enacted a statute prohibiting
any state regulation of surface coal mining, the Court found irrational any
suggestion that the Act became "constitutionally suspect simply because
Congress chose to allow the States a regulatory role."' °6 Thus, because
'
03 Id. at 461.
14 452 U.S. 264 (1981). The Commonwealth of Virginia intervened as plaintiff.
105 Id. at 288-89.
'
06 Id. at 290.
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Virginia's right to control its pollution permit program is not a fundamental
sovereign power and because its participation in the regulatory scheme is
voluntary, the Attorney General's Tenth Amendment challenge to EPA's
proposal must also fail.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a result of Virginia's "owner aggrieved" standing requirement, 10 7
the only entity who can challenge the legality of a VPDES permit is the
permit holder. Although DEQ must submit proposed permits to EPA which
can object or make recommendations to the proposed permit within thrity
days from the date of receipt,' EPA lacks adequate resources to effectively
oversee every detail of VPDES permits."°9 There is no reason to assume a
VPDES permit holder would object to its permit on the grounds that it is too
lenient;"' therefore, in drafting permits, DEQ has no incentive to create
stringent discharge limits. Allied Corporation's ("Allied") permit to
discharge pollution into the James River in Hopewell, Virginia demonstrates
this problem.
On March 31, 1995, DEQ renewed Allied's VPDES permit. "' Allied
discharges pollutants into Gravelly and Poythress Runs which are tributaries
that lead into the James River. Although the permit designates these
tributaries as the receiving streams,"' the permit allows Allied to calculate
07 As compared to the CWA's "interested person" standard. See text accompanying notes
32 and 50.
30' See Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Permit and Enforcement Programs
Between the State Water Control Board and the Regional Administrator, Region III,
Environmental Protection Agency, pt. III(6)(b) (Mar. 31, 1975) (copy on file with William
& Mary Environmental Law & Policy Review) [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding].
" See Hodas, supra note 15, at 1604, for the proposition that in order to create compliance
with environmental laws, four elements are required: "(1) significant likelihood that
violation will be detected; (2) swift and sure enforcement response; (3) appropriately severe
sanctions; and (4) that each of these factors will be perceived as real." The government,
however, does not, nor ever will, have the sufficient resources to meet these requirements.
"0 Occasionally one may encounter a benevolent corporation willing to challenge DEQ
because its VPDES permit does not meet the CWA's minimum requirements.
... DEQ Permit No. VA0005291 (copy on file with William & Mary Environmental Law
& Policy Review) [hereinafter Permit].
32 Receiving streams are those bodies of water into which Allied directly pollutes.
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the level of pollution based on the water quality standards of the James
River."3 Thus, the permit effectively treats Gravelly and Poythress Runs as
an extension of Allied's discharge pipe and not as state waters.
Environmental groups challenged the validity of this permit."4 These
groups set forth two arguments. First, challenging DEQ's claim that the
tributaries are ephemeral streams and the permit, therefore, should be based
on the James River, which is the nearest free-flowing stream, the groups
contended DEQ's definition of ephemeral streams did not apply." 5 In an
internal memorandum, DEQ had defined an ephemeral stream as one that
"'would normally have no active aquatic community.""' 6 A fishery survey,
however, reported the presence of at least thirteen species in Gravelly Run.I 7
Second, the environmental groups noted that Virginia's State Water Control
Law defined state waters as "'all waters, on the surface and under the
ground .. .'18 Furthermore, Hopewell designated the land surrounding
Gravelly Run as a "Resource Protection Area" to be protected under the
Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act." 9 Thus, the environmental groups argued
Gravelly Run is a part of the state's waters and should be the body of water
from which Allied calculates the level of water toxicity. 2 Unable to make
their challenges in a state court, the groups could only request a formal public
hearing from DEQ. DEQ denied any changes. Instead, DEQ held a meeting
where the members of the public could offer their comments.' 2' Following
13 See Permit, supra note 111.
See Letter from Chesapeake Bay Foundation to Virginia Department of Environmental
Quality (Mar. 10, 1995) (on file with William & Mary Environmental Law & Policy
Review), and Letter from Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility to Virginia
Department of Environmental Quality (Dec. 5, 1994) (on file with William & Mary
Environmental Law & Policy Review).
115 See Letter from Chesapeake Bay Foundation to Department of Environmental Quality,
supra note 114.
..
6 Id. (citing from Larry G. Lawson and Alan J. Anthony, Department of Environmental
Quality, OWRM Program Guidance Memorandum 91-002 (Jan. 15, 1992)).
"7 See id.
..8 Letter from Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility to Department of
Environmental Quality, supra note 114 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-10 (Michie 1992)).
1 9 See Letter from Chesapeake Bay Foundation to Department of Environmental Quality,
supra note 114.
120 See id.; see also Letter from Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility to
Department of Environmental Quality, supra note 114.
2' Interview with Roy Hoagland, Attorney for Chesapeake Bay Foundation, in Richmond,
Va. (Feb. 1, 1996).
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the meeting, no action occurred, and the Allied permit remained unchanged.
Had EPA never delegated to Virginia the authority to run the NPDES
program and had EPA issued the Allied permit, citizens could have
challenged the permit in federal court. 22 Without the availability of such a
challenge, there remains no realistic check. It is unlikely the holder will
complain, and because of the strain on EPA's resources, the federal
government has basically abandoned its enforcement role in states that run
the NPDES permit Program.123 Moreover, Virginia has an incentive to
continue issuing permits that violate the standards of the CWA in favor of the
polluter/holder: it can induce businesses to locate within its borders with
assurances of lax standards and weak enforcement which translate into
economic advantages over competitors in states with more stringent pollution
requirements. 24
EPA's proposed rule will guarantee that private citizens will be able
to protect the waters of their state. Congress envisioned that citizens play
such a role and provided EPA with significant power to ensure it. As the rule
is legally valid, EPA should promulgate its proposal so that citizen attorneys
general will be able to continue their effective enforcement' 25 of the CWA
and uphold the pollution limits created by the CWA.
12See CWA § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994). Note, however, that the citizens first
would have had to raise the challenge with EPA. See CWA § 505(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. §
1365(b)(1)(A). Once EPA's decision to issue the permit became final, then the citizen group
could have challenged the permit in federal district court. See Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
123 See generally Hodas, supra note 15.
"" The businesses would be able to spend less on cleaning up and also worry significantly
less about possible litigation costs. See id. at 1615-18; see also Cathryn McCue, Virgina
Polluters Go Free, Critics Say, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Jan. 8, 1995, at Al
(DEQ's "desire to avoid adversarial relationships with industries and localities, whom it
refers to as 'customers,' has influenced how permits are written, how fast they're issued,
how policies are made and how enforcement is pursued, [DEQ] employees say.")
'25 As of 1993, "citizen suit judicial enforcement nearly equaled all CWA judicial
enforcement efforts brought throughout the nation by all the states and the federal
government combined." Hodas, supra note 15, at 1620.
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